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Brennan: Brennan: Receipt of a Profits Interest

The Receipt of a Profits Interest in a
Partnership as a Taxable Event after
Campbell, and Mark IV
I. INTRODUCTION
For years tax advisors have assumed that the receipt of a profits interest
in a partnership in return for services is not a taxable event; instead, the
stream of income derived from the profits interest is taxable as received. The
only authority to the contrary was considered an "aberration" and nearly
A tax court memorandum decision, Campbell v.
completely disregarded

Commissioner,4 appeared to change the way in which tax advisors must
approach the topic. Mark IV Productions,Inc. v. Commissioner,5 a memorandum decision handed down only seven months after Campbell, however,
abruptly altered once again the tax court's position on taxing the receipt of a
partnership interest as income when received in exchange for services. Most6
recently, the Eighth Circuit reversed the tax court's decision in Campbell.
The Eighth Circuit, however, did not settle this issue of partnership tax law.
This Comment explores the history of the taxation of a partnership profits
interest and discusses how the tax court's Campbell decision deviated from

prior law. It also examines the recent Mark IV case, which fails to follow the
Campbell analysis. Finally, this Comment analyzes the Eighth Circuit's
opinion in Campbell. All three cases raise serious questions and confusion for
anyone trying to advise clients of the tax liability on the receipt of a profits
interest in a partnership in return for services. Therefore, this Comment
discusses the possible ramifications of each decision and suggests the most
desirable course for the law to follow.

1. Campbell v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 236 (1990), aff'd inpart,rev'd
in part, 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991).
2. Mark IV Productions, Inc. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 1171 (1990).

3. Diamond v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 530, affid, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974).
4. 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 236 (1990), affid in part, rev'd in part,943 F.2d 815 (8th

Cir. 1991).
5. 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 1171 (1990).

6. Campbell v. Commissioner, 943 F.2d 815, 823 (8th Cir. 1991).
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II. THE DIAMOND CASE

In Diamondv. Commissioner,7 the tax court first held that the receipt of
an interest in the profits and losses of a partnership in exchange for services
was subject to taxation upon its receipt. The Diamond decision engendered
an array of negative commentary, and later court decisions seemingly
diminished its importance. Practitioners assumed that the Diamond holding
was limited to the unique factual setting presented by the case.
Diamond, the taxpayer, had arranged the financing of an office building
for a person who owned an option to purchase it. In return for his services,
the taxpayer received a sixty percent interest in the profits and losses of a
partnership formed to sell the property. Only three weeks later the taxpayer
sold his interest in the partnership for $40,000. The taxpayer reported the
gain as a short-term capital gain rather than as income.8
While admitting that an interest in partnership capital in exchange for
services would be taxable upon receipt of the interest, the taxpayer contended
that an interest in partnership profits and losses (a "profits interest") qualified
for nonrecognition under Treasury Regulation section 1.721-1(b)(1).9
The tax court, while noting that the regulation was unclear, rejected the
taxpayer's argument.' ° The court held that the regulation did not require the
application of section 721 to the facts and that such an application would
result in a distortion of the statute." The court easily rejected the taxpayer's
argument that the interest he received was worthless because that interest was
sold less than three weeks later for $40,000.12 The court held that the
taxpayer should include this amount in the taxpayer's gross income upon
3
receipt of the partnership interest.'

7. 56 T.C. 530, affid, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974).
8. Id.
9. Id. The regulation provides, in part:
Normally, under local law, each partner is entitled to be repaid his
contribution of money or other property to the partnership ....

To the

extent that any of the partners gives up any part of his right to be repaid his
contributions (as distinguished from a share in partnership profits) in favor
of another partner as compensation for services (or in satisfaction of an
obligation), section 721 does not apply.
Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1971).
10. Diamond,56 T.C. at 530.

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol57/iss1/11

2

Brennan:
Brennan:
Receipt of a Profits Interest
TAXING
A PROFITS
INTEREST

1992]

The Seventh Circuit affirmed, but the court recommended that regulations
be issued to clarify the proper treatment of the receipt of a profits interest in
exchange for services.14
H. THE DIAMOND AFTERMATH:

CRITICISM, CASES AND PRACTICE

Until 1990, Diamond was the only case to hold that the receipt of a
profits interest in a partnership was a taxable event. Commentaries heavily
criticized the case, later cases limited the scope of the holding, and tax
advisors confidently advised clients that their profits interests were not taxable
upon receipt unless the situation was comparable to Diamond itself.
Therefore, it became a "settled administrative practice" not to include the
profits interest in income upon receipt unless the interest had an immediate
liquidation value. 5
Because of the peculiar facts in Diamond (namely, that the partnership
interest received in exchange for services was sold soon after receipt), most
practitioners considered the holding of the case to be limited to the situation
involved therein. 6 No other cases extended the Diamond holding beyond
the facts presented there, reinforcing the idea that Diamond was indeed a
narrow holding. Tax advisors followed the Diamond holding only where the
interest in partnership profits received had a "determinable market value."' 7
Furthermore, a "sufficiently speculative" income interest could have no market
value.'
Criticism of Diamond abounded.' Much of the criticism centered on
two problems with the decision: valuation and double taxation. While

14. Diamond v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 286, 291 (7th Cir. 1974).
15. Jan Bradshaw & Kim Itakura, CampbellRenews Controversy Over Taxation
of a PartnershipInterestfor Services, J. PARTNERSHIP TAx'N 211 (1987).
16. Id. at 216. For a discussion of valuing profits interests as the income to be
received upon immediate liquidation, see infra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
17. Louis H. Diamond & James E. Salles, The Receipt ofPropertyfor Services
After the TRA: Some Provisions Now Work in the Taxpayer's Favor, 1988 TAX
ADVIsER 325,

337.

18. Id. For example, a partnership interest in a partnership that owned a
completely leased shopping center and which had a history of stable rental streams and
triple net leases would probably have a determinable market value. On the other hand,
a partnership interest in a start-up real estate venture by a new developer who has no
real estate development experience and who relies only on financial projections would
have only a speculative value.
19. See, e.g., 1 A. WILLIS, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION, § 11.03 (2d ed. 1976);
Martin B. Cowan, Receipt of an Interest in PartnershipProfits: The'Diamond Case,
27 TAx. L. REv. 161 (1972) (cited in Diamond v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 286, 291
(7th Cir. 1974)).
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valuation was easy in the Diamond case because of the immediate sale of the
interest, valuing other profits interests posed quite a problem. If no sale of the
profits interest occurred, valuation would only be a speculative venture,
particularly in the case of a start-up business. Also, because the stream of
income from the profits interest would be taxable as received, taxing the
receipt of the right to receive profits resulted in double taxation. This was a
particularly untenable result where the profits interest had restrictions upon
transfer, making the value of the profits interest the present value of the future
income stream. The Service and the courts soon redressed the frustration
vented in the commentaries.
Soon after the announcement of Diamond the Service issued General
Counsel's Memorandum 36,346
"The GCM stated that the Diamond
decision was soundly criticized as being contrary to Regulations Section
1.721-1; it created severe valuation problems; and it resulted in double
taxation to the service partner."21 The Service stated that because the
regulations were meant to achieve the opposite result, the Service would not
use Diamond to require service partners to report as income the receipt of a
profits interest in return for services. 22 Furthermore, the GCM indicated that
a pure profits interest was similar to "an unfunded, unsecured promise to pay
contingent deferred compensation," and was, therefore, not taxable under
section 61 and not property under section 83.'
Unlike an interest in partnership capital, a pure profits interest gives the
holder no immediate right to partnership assets upon liquidation.24 On the
other hand, a "profits interest" that grants the recipient the right to participate
in previously accrued profits and appreciation is, in reality, a capital interest
and should be taxed as such.25 This "liquidation approach" (testing the value
of the partnership interest received by determining its value upon immediate
liquidation of the partnership and only subjecting to current taxation that
liquidation value) was followed in the post-Diamond cases.
The three major cases that followed Diamond found that the service
partner was not required to include the value of his partnership profits interest
in income. In St. John v. United States, 2 the court adopted the liquidation
approach as a matter of law. The court held for the taxpayer, finding that the
taxpayer's interest could be valued, if ever, only when the partnership became

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,346 (July 25, 1977).
Bradshaw & Itakura, supra note 15, at 216.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 216-17.
Id. at 217.
53 A.F.T.R.2d 84-718 (P-H) (C.D. I11.
1983).
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profitable. 27 In Kenroy, Inc. v. Commissioner,2s the court, applying the
liquidation test, held that the limited partners' priority rights upon immediate
liquidation were greater than the equity in the partnership; thus, the general
partner's profits interest had no value upon liquidation, and the taxpayer need
not include receipt of the interest in income when received. 29 In National
Oil v. Commissioner,0 the Service agreed that a pure profits interest was not
taxable. The Service proceeded on the theory that the taxpayer had instead
received a capital interest in the partnership. Because the court disagreed with
the Service's interpretation, the taxpayer won the case.'
Interestingly, neither GCM 36,346 nor the cases decided subsequent to
Diamond were cited in Campbell.
IV.

32

CAMPBELL V. COMMISSIONER

William G. Campbell and his wife challenged the Commissioner's
determination of his tax liability for the years 1979 and 1980 before Judge
Scott of the United States Tax Court.3 Campbell and his wife ("taxpayer")
filed income tax returns on the cash method of accounting.3 4
Campbell was employed by the Summa T. Group and performed most of
his services for Summa T. Realty, a real estate brokerage and consulting
firm. 5 The Summa T. Group and its affiliates formed and syndicated limited
partnerships. 3 6 Taxpayer's duties included: locating suitable properties for
Summa T. Realty, negotiating the acquisition of those properties, obtaining the
financing necessary to acquire the properties, organizing the partnerships that
would eventually acquire those properties, and assisting in the preparation of
offering materials in connection with the syndication of those partnerships.37

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
1991).

Bradshaw & Itakura, supra note 15, at 217-18.
53 T.C.M. (CCH) 232 (1984).
Bradshaw & Itakura, supra note 15, at 218.
55 T.C.M. (CCH) 596 (1986).
Bradshaw & Itakura, supra note 15, at 218.
59 T.C.M. (CCH) 251, aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir.
Although the tax court's decision was later reversed, the Eighth Circuit's
opinion fails to resolve many of the legal issues presented by the case; see infra text
accompanying notes 159-167. A full discussion of the tax court's decision is,
therefore, warranted.
33. Campbell, 159 T.C.M. (CCH) at 236.
34. Id.
35. Campbell, 943 F.2d at 817-18.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 818.
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Taxpayer "also helped promote the sale of partnership interests to prospective
investors. " "
In return for his services, taxpayer received fifteen percent of the
proceeds stemming from each partnership syndication.3 9 For the partnerships
that the taxpayer helped to form and finance, he also received a "special
limited partnership interest."4 Two tax attorneys advised Campbell that he
need not include these special limited partnership interests as taxable income
in the year of receipt. Both attorneys knew of the Diamond decision. 41 The
receipt of these partnership interests would generate immediate tax benefits,
but "[c]ampbell
was also enthusiastic about the residual value these interests
42
have.,
might
In 1979, the taxpayer received a two percent special limited partnership
interest in Phillips House Associates, Ltd.. In 1980, taxpayer received a one
percent special limited partnership interest in The Grand, Ltd. and Airport
1980, Ltd. The taxpayer received each of these special limited partnership
interests in consideration for services performed by him in the creation and
syndication of the partnerships.4
While each of the limited partnerships
contemplated separate business ventures, they were all similarly structured,
and the benefits that Campbell received were nearly identical in each
partnership.
Phillips House Associates, Ltd. ("Phillips House") serves as an excellent
example of the structure of these limited partnerships. The partnership
acquired a hotel in Kansas City, Missouri, for $1.6 million.' Restoration
costs were estimated at $6,675,000 and losses were expected for the first
several years.45 Of the partnership's $3,505,050 total capitalization, the two
special limited partners contributed $300.4
According to the Phillips House offering memorandum, 94 percent of the
profits and losses of the partnership were to be allocated to the Class A
limited partners, 2 percent of the profits and losses were to be allocated to

38. Id.
39. Id. at 817.
40. Id.
41. Id. This illustrates the point made earlier thai the Diamond holding was
disregarded except for situations resembling the facts presented in that case. See supra
notes 20-30 and accompanying text. The Diamonddecision is discussed supra notes
6-30 and accompanying text.
42. Id. at 816.
43. Id. at 817.
44. Id. at 816-17.
45. Id. at 819.
46. Id.
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the general partner, and 2 percent of the profits and losses were to be
allocated to each of the special limited partners. 47
From cash generated from the partnership's operation, the Class A limited
partners (those to whom the limited partnership interests were syndicated)
were entitled to a "priority return" each year of ten percent of their capital
contributions.48 Cash would then be allocated to the special limited partners
who had "special priority returns" of $7,391. 49 Next, the sole general partner
would receive the same amount. The partnership was to distribute the
remaining cash according to the schedule described above.50
The offering memorandum projected that the special limited partners
could expect $128,280 in tax losses, $26,120 in income, and $10,151 in
investment tax credits over the ensuing eleven years. 51 In addition, the
special limited partners "were entitled to share in any proceeds
which might
52
become available from the sale or refinancing of the Hotel."
In 1979, taxpayer claimed $4,191 in deductions from his special limited
partnership interest in Phillips House.53 In 1980, he claimed $50,413 in
deductions from losses incurred by the three limited partnerships.. 4 In
response, the Service contended that the taxpayer realized $42,084 in income
from the receipt of his interest in Phillips House and $37,651 in income from
the interests in The Grand, Ltd. and Airport 1980, Ltd. After deducting the
losses from the operations of the partnerships, the Service contended that

47. Id.
48. Id.

49. Id. at 820.
50. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
51. Id.

The offering memorandum warned that the partnership intended to take
positions with respect to certain deductions and allocations that were not
based on settled interpretations of tax law and that, if the Internal Revenue
Service were to audit the returns of the partnership and its Class A limited
partners, some or all of the deductions and allocations would probably be
disallowed.
Id. at 820.
52. Id. at 821.
53. Id. at 821-22.
54. Id.
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taxpayer had56income of $40,164 in 1979 and $40,131" in 1980 from the
partnerships.
Before trial, the taxpayer and the Commissioner agreed on the proper
amounts of losses of the partnerships, the proportionate deductions, and the
allowable amounts of charitable contributions.
Thus, issues left for
adjudication were whether the limited partnership interests were to be included
as income upon receipt, and, if so, the values to be assigned to those
interests."
Campbell challenged, on three grounds, the Commissioner's determination that the partnership interests were to be included as income at the time
of receipt. First, the taxpayer argued that because the special limited
partnership interests were interests only in profits and losses they should not
be included as income upon receipt; the taxpayer based this argument on
section 721 and its regulations.59 Second, the taxpayer argued that section
83 precluded inclusion of the interests in income in the year of receipt because
the interests were never "transferred" to him, or, alternatively, the interests
were subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture6W Third, the taxpayer
contended that even if the other arguments failed, the interests were too
speculative to be valued at more than $1,000 each.61
A. Section 721
Section 721(a) is a nonrecognition provision, excluding from income any
gain or loss realized when a partner exchanges "property" for an interest in a
partnership. 62 The taxpayer reasoned that regulation 1.721-1(b)(1) allows a
contributing partner to contribute services as well as property in exchange for
a partnership interest. 63 The taxpayer argued that the regulation creates a
distinction between the receipt of an interest in the capital of a partnership and
the receipt of a profits interest.64 The tax court responded by citing and

55. This amount is greater than the value put on the two partnership interests by
the Service because the Service contended that the taxpayer received $9,324 in income
from the Phillips House partnership.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. These same issues were also raised on appeal.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See supra note 7.
63. Campbell, 492 F.2d. at 819 n.4.
64. Id.
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reaffirming Diamond.' In refusing to reverse the holding in Diamond, the
tax court stated the following:
[S]ection 721(a) and the regulations thereunder are simply inapplicable
where ...a partner receives his partnership interest in exchange for

services he has rendered to the partnership. In order to invoke the benefits
of nonrecognition under section 721(a), the taxpayer must contribute
"property" to the partnership in exchange for his partnership interest....
The Stafford case makes it clear that services are not "property" for the
purposes of section 721(a). 66
Section 721, the court stated, was intended to afford nonrecognition to a
taxpayer who, through the contribution of property in exchange for a
partnership interest, merely changes the form of an asset; it was not intended
to provide nonrecognition for a partnership interest received as compensation
for services rendered to the partnership. 67 Furthermore, the court declared
that section 721 makes no distinction between capital and profits interests in
providing nonrecognition treatment to partners. 6 The court stated it was
therefore "inconsistent" for Campbell to argue that a service partner would be
taxed upon the receipt of a capital interest in a partnership in exchange for
services at the time of receipt, but that the same partner could avail itself of
nonrecognition under section 721(a) if it received a profits interest in
exchange for services. 69 The court summarized, "after reexamining our
holding in Diamond v. Commissioner, supra, we are convinced that section
721(a) is inapplicable to the receipt of any type of partnership interest in
exchange for services." 70 Therefore, the court held that the partnership
interests received by Campbell were not within the nonrecognition protection
of section 721(a). 7'

65. Id. at 730. The Diamond case is discussed, supra notes 6-30 and accompanying text.
66. Id. (citing United States v. Stafford, 727 F.2d 1043, 1048 (11th Cir. 1984)).
67. Campbell, 943 F.2d at 817-18.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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B. Section 83
The court found that section 83 governs the timing of the inclusion of the
value of a partnership interest in income. 72 Section 83 is satisfied and the
partnership interest must be included in income when three factors are present.
"First, the thing transferred in connection with the performance of services
must be 'property' as that term is used in section 83."'' The court reasoned
that the partnership interests were personal property under state law, and that
there was no distinction between a profits interest and a capital interest. 74
The taxpayer, however, argued that a pure profits interest is akin to "an
unfunded and unsecured promise to pay money or property in the future,"
which is excluded from the definition of property in the section 83 regulations.75 The court found that "a partnership profits interest is not a 'promise
to pay"' because a promise to pay is usually for a fixed amount and is not
determinant upon business success, unlike a profits interest.76 Also, the

72. Id. Section 83 provides, in part,
(a) General Rule.-If, in connection with the performance of services,
property is transferred to any person other than the person for whom such
services are performed, the excess of(1)the fair market value of such property (determined without regard to any
restriction other than a restriction which by its terms will never lapse) at the
first time the rights of the person having the beneficial interest in such
property are transferable or are not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture,
whichever occurs earlier, over
(2) the amount (if any) paid for such property,
shall be included in the gross income of the person who performed such
services in the first taxable year in which the rights of the person having the
beneficial interest in such property are transferable or are not subject to a
substantial risk of forfeiture, whichever is applicable.
I.R.C. § 83 (1988).
73. Campbell, 943 F.2d at 819-20.
74. Id. at 819.
75. Id. Regulation section 1.83-3(e) provides that "the term 'property' includes
real and personal property other than either money or an unfunded and unsecured
promise to pay money or property in the future." Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (1971). One
should compare the Campbell conclusion with the opinion expressed in Gen. Couns.
Mem. 36,346 (July 25, 1977). For a discussion of GCM 36,346, see supra note 20
and accompanying text.
76. Campbell, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) at 250.
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taxpayer's partnership interest allowed deductions for partnership losses, a
feature unknown to promises to pay. 77
The second factor that must be satisfied for the inclusion of the interest
in income under section 83 is that the property "must be transferred in
connection with the performance of services. ' M Because the taxpayer had
been the only limited partner at the time that two of the partnerships were
formed and the taxpayer had paid $100 and $150 for his limited partner
shares, he asserted that there was no "transfer" in connection with services."

Rather, he contended that the partnership interests were transferred in
exchange for his monetary investments and that those sums paid for his
interests were adequate at the time of transfer; any increase in the values of
his partnership interests was "sweat equity" due to his hard work.80 The tax
court responded that "for the purposes of Federal taxation, the substance of a
transaction, rather than its form, will control."81 In substance, the court
claimed, the partnerships "were nothing more than empty shells awaiting
syndication" at formation8 Campbell received his beneficial interests in the
partnerships as part of his compensation package from Summa T. Group, and
he did not acquire his interest until after syndication. As evidence that the
special limited partnership interests were transferred in connection with
services rendered rather than purchased by the taxpayer, the tax court pointed
out that the limited partnership interests received upon partnership formation
were quite dissimilar from the special limited partnership interests that he
expected to own and in fact did own later.8 Furthermore, the amount of
capital contributed by the taxpayer "bore no relation to the value of the
different interests he received for his services. '' 4
The third factor that must be present for section 83 to apply is "that either
the property transferred must be transferable by the recipient or the property
transferred must not be subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture."8 Because
both parties apparently agreed that the taxpayer's rights to transfer his special
limited partnership interests were restricted, the court focused on the issue of
whether the interests were subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. The
taxpayer claimed that there was a substantial risk of forfeiture under section

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(a)(1) (1971).
Campbell, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) at 251.
Id.
Id. at 251 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 252.
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83(c)(1).86 The risk of forfeiture stemmed from the fact that the partnership
would distribute nothing to the taxpayer until its economic performance
improved. Thus, the taxpayer argued, he could not fully enjoy the partnership
interests until he improved the financial performance of the partnerships with
substantial servicesYu
The tax court rejected this line of attack.8 The taxpayer had focused
on the speculative nature of the partnership interests received. According to
the court, the speculative nature affected the interests' values but did not
render the interests subject to forfeiture.89 Also, the court held that section

1.83-3(c)(2) did not apply when the forfeited property was not to be returned
to the employer. 9° Therefore, the taxpayer's interests were not subject to a
substantial risk of forfeiture once the partnerships reached the subscription
levels necessary to become operational, and the court required the taxpayer to
include the receipt of the partnership interests in income. 9'
C. Valuation
Having determined that the value of the partnership interests was to be
included in income, the tax court next addressed how to value those interests.
The Commissioner had asserted that the value of the interests should be the
present value of the projected tax benefits and cash flows based on each
partnership's offering memorandum.'
The Commissioner calculated the
discount rate by finding the discount rate that would reduce the future value
of all the tax and income benefits the class A limited partners were projected
to receive from each partnership interest to the value that the class A limited
partners paid for that interest.93 Applying this method, the Commissioner
determined that the total value of the taxpayer's special limited partnership
interests was $116,000. 4 The taxpayer objected to this valuation.

86. Id. Section 83(c)(1) provides: "[t]he rights of a person in property are
subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture if such person's rights to full enjoyment of
such property are conditioned upon the future performance of substantial services by
any individual." I.R.C. § 83(c)(1) (1988) (quoted in Campbell, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) at
252).
87. Campbell, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) at 252.
88. Id.
89. Id. The court likened this to a corporate employee who receives unrestricted
common stock as part of his compensation. Id.
90. Id. at 252-53.
91. Id. at 253.
92. Id.
93. Id. The discount rate was 17.9 percent. Id. at 253.
94. Id. at 254.
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First, the taxpayer objected to valuing his partnership interests at all,
claiming that their value was too speculative to be included in income. 95
Next, the taxpayer claimed that even if the partnership interests could be
valued, the value of each partnership interest did not exceed $1,000.' An
expert on valuation of intangible assets testified for the taxpayer at trial. The
taxpayer's expert, like the Commissioner, discounted the expected cash
distributions from each partnership. The expert, however, calculated the
discount rate by multiplying the Baa corporate bond rate for the year in which
each partnership interest was received by a factor of 2.5." Thus, the expert
found that the present value of the projected income stream totaled
$14,306.98 Taxpayer's expert did not add the value of the projected loss
stream from the partnerships because the offering memoranda stated that there
was a substantial risk that the tax benefits?9 would be disallowed if the
partnerships were audited. The taxpayer's expert, unlike the Commissioner,
took other factors into account as well, such as the restrictions on the
transferability of the special limited partnership interests and the inability of
the special limited partners to take part in management. Thus, he concluded
that none of taxpayer's partnership interests were worth more than $1,000
upon receipt."

The tax court rejected the assertion of the taxpayer's expert that the
valuation was only speculative because limited partnership interests, which
were characterized by the court as "similar interests" to those received by
taxpayer, were sold for "concrete prices" at the same time the taxpayer
received his special limited partnership interests.10' The court also rejected
the expert's approach to valuing the projected tax losses. The court stated, "it
is true that some of the items that generated these losses were questionable.
However, the Class A limited partners were willing to pay substantial amounts
for these very same tax losses despite the chance that some of them might be
disallowed."'' °
Because taxpayer's expert had valued each partnership
interest at $1,000 despite differences between the partnerships as to their
economic positions, the prices for the limited partnership interests, the
projected cash distributions, and the projected tax benefits, the court refused

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. As far as one can glean from the opinion, the offering memoranda
detailed how gains from sales of partnership properties were to be divided but did not
make any projections as to the amount of those gains.
99. Id. Tax benefits are considered the pass-through deductions.
100. Id. at 254.
101. Id. at 255.
102. Id.
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"to accept an expert valuation which is unreasonable, without basis, and quite
obviously plucked out of thin air."'0 3
The tax court, however, did agree with the taxpayer's expert on the
correct method of choosing a discount rate."° The rate that the Commissioner had chosen was based on assumptions about the future of the
partnerships' operations and was thus incorrect. 5
When valuing the
taxpayer's interest in Phillips House, the court further reduced the value of the
partnership interest to account for the substantially superior rights that the
limited partners had as compared to the special limited partners. °6 The
court concluded that the total value of taxpayer's partnership interests was
$56,818.'07
D. Negligence Penalty
The Commissioner additionally sought a negligence penalty l 8 for a
variety of "abusive deductions,"'0° asserting that, "given Mr. Campbell's
contacts with the partnerships and his position within Realty Properties as well
as the other members of the Summa T. Group, he must have been aware that
these deductions were abusive and, therefore, petitioners were negligent in
deducting their distributive share of these amounts on their returns."110 The
tax court agreed and imposed the penalty,'" but the court specifically
disavowed that it allowed the penalty -on the ground that the taxpayer was
negligent in not including in income the value
of the partnership interests
12
received for services in the year of receipt.

103. Id.
104. Id. at 256.
105. Id. at 255. The Commissioner, for example, made the assumption that the
projects would be sold when they ceased providing tax benefits. Id.
106. Id. at 256.
107. Id.
108. Id. For the period of time at issue, the negligence penalty was codified in
I.R.C. section 6653(a). The penalty was equal to five percent of the underpayment.
Id.
109. Id. at 257.
110. Id. at 257.
111. Id. at 258.
112. Id. The court stated:
Since we have concluded that the part of the deficiencies due to petitioners'
claiming excessive deductions and credits in each year here involved was
due to negligence, we need not discuss whether petitioners' failure to
include in each year any amount as the value of a partnership interest
received for services rendered was negligent.
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V. THE REACTION TO CAMPBELL
The reaction to Campbell has been uniformly negative. The Campbell
13
decision "has caused confusion and alarm among some tax professionals."'
"The Campbell decision sent the organized bar into hysteria, with many
practitioners and former government officials apparently ready to start
chucking tea into Boston harbor."" 4 One commentator states, "it would
have been difficult for a case more to have disturbed the status quo of
partnership tax advisors than Campbell has done-quite a lot for a memorandum decision to accomplish.""
Indeed, the tax court's decision wrought
great criticism and even more speculation as to the correct law to be applied.
Nothing in the Campbell decision addresses any of the criticisms
previously leveled at Diamond. Thus, all of the pre-Campbell commentary
remains valid today. Although Campbell apparently clarified how to value a
profits interest (by calculating the present value of the projected cash
distributions and tax benefits set forth in financial projections), the court's
approach remains subject to valid concerns. Furthermore, the case leaves in
doubt the precedential value of the cases decided between Diamond and
Campbell, as none of those cases was cited in Campbell. The same doubt
lingers as to the Service's position taken in GCM 36,346. Commentators have
also criticized the court's failure to address whether a taxpayer who fails to
include the receipt of a partnership profits interest in income is subject to a
negligence penalty. 6 While the scope and applicability of Campbell are
of great concern, the more difficult questions arise concerning the consequences to a service partner and to the partnership where the Campbell decision is
applicable.

113. Charles R. Levun & Michael J.Cohen, Campbell'sQuandary,68 TAxES 498
(1991).
114. Terrence F. Cuff, Campbell v. Commissioner: Is There Now "Littleor No
Chance" of Taxation of a "Profits"Interest in a Partnership? 69 TAXES 643, 651
(1991).
115. Terrence F. Cuff, New Decision Threatens Tax-Free Formation of Most
Partnerships,J. TAX'N, July 1990, at 56.
The surprise that Campbell has caused belies its designation as a Memorandum
decision. "Memorandum decisions ...involve the application of settled legal
principles to the facts." Boris I. Bittker & Martin J.McMahon, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAS

46-9 (1988). See also GAIL L. RICHMOND, FEDERAL TAX
77 (4th ed. 1990). The reaction

RESEARCH: GUIDE TO MATERIALS AND TECHNIQUES

to Campbell shows that the principles it espouses are far from settled. Indeed, one
need only compare Campbell with Mark IV, discussed infra notes 132-52, to find that
the proper treatment of a partnership profits interest in exchange for services is an
unclear area of tax law.
116. See, e.g., Cuff, supra note 114, at 56.
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One commentator" 7 outlined six difficult collateral issues associated
with the Campbell decision." 8 First, the tax court did not define the scope
of section 83 as applied 'to the receipt of profits interests in partnerships.
Section 83 could apply where, as in Campbell, the service partner received its
interest for services rendered for its employer, or it could apply more broadly
to encompass situations where the service partner rendered its services for the
partnership. More importantly, section 83 could create an "impossible
administrative burden" if applied to a service partner who is obliged to
perform future services." 9 The commentator suggested that this would be

most troublesome in professional partnerships where interests in the partnership are given in exchange for both past and future services; 120 Campbell
could be interpreted as possibly creating a taxable event even to the extent
that the interest is given for future, services.
Second, if a service partner is taxed upon the receipt of its interest, it
should be able to increase its basis in the interest and be able to use this basis
against the income stream.'
No present authority, however, allows this
treatment."' If amortizing the basis against future income is not allowed,
the service partner might still take a capital loss upon withdrawal or
liquidation. 12A The service partner, however, may not be able to use this
loss, and the partner must pay the double tax in the meantime. Indeed, if a
partnership profits interest is taxed upon receipt just like a capital interest,
then identical tax treatment should be followed throughout the time during
which the service partner has a profits interest in the partnership.
Next, the commentator questions whether a capital account is created in
the partnership when the service partner receives a profits interest. The
partnership should be able to account for the value of the asset acquired
(future services). The regulations fail to cover this area, and tax advisors are
at a loss as to the proper treatment."' Again, this treatment would be
consistent with the holding that a profits interest is taxed the same as a capital
interest.

117. See Cuff, supra note 114, at 45-48.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Indeed, imagine the desirability of becoming a partner in a law firm if the
immediate consequence is a tax on the present value of the partner's future income
stream!
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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Fourth, the transfer of a profits interest to the service partner may be a
taxable event to the partnership because, if section 721 does not protect the
service partner from recognizing income, then it also fails to protect the
The commentator
partnership from recognizing gain on the transfer."
suggests that either of two theories might compel the partnership to recognize
gain, either "under an assignment of income theory (the transfer of a profits
interest being treated as an assignment of future income), or under the theory
that the partnership has sold a partnership interest in a taxable transaction."'127 Also, this commentator questions whether the partnership may
deduct the profits interest as compensation and whether the partnership must
Recognition of
comply with the employee tax withholding obligation."
partnership gain, compensation deductions, and tax withholdings are all natural
consequences of holding that a transfer of a profits interest is a taxable event.
These unsolved issues add greatly to the confusion generated by the Campbell
decision.
Fifth, a special allocation of the deductions associated with the transfer
of the profits interest is difficult without first resolving the previously
warns that such allocations
considered issues.'29 Moreover, the commentator
"may affect the economics of the partnership." 3 1
Finally, any attempts to prevent the inclusion of the profits interest in
current income by making the interest non-transferable and subject to a
substantial risk of forfeiture may have collateral effects.
How does the service partner account for income or loss that arises during
the period that the partnership interest is restricted? Is it possible to
allocate income or loss to someone who is not treated as a partner? How
is capital contributed by the service partner properly accounted for by the
partnership, since the service partner is not yet treated as a partner?131
What is the status of a two-man partnership when the interest of one of the
two partners has not vested? What is the status of a partnership all of the
interests in which have not vested? What is the status of a limited
partnership where the sole general
partner's interest has not vested? These
132
questions remain unanswered.

126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 50.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Recall that in Campbell, the taxpayer contributed some capital, albeit a small
amount, at the time he received his profits interest. See note 40 and accompanying
text.
132. See Cuff, supra note 114, at 46-48.
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And if one thought that the course had not yet been sufficiently confused,
still another tax court memorandum decision attempts to dizzy any would-be
tax navigator.
VI. MARK IV PICTURES, INC. V. COMMISSIONER133
Mark IV, decided by the tax court on October 31, 1990, followed on the
heels of Campbell, which was handed down in March 1990, and yet the
opinion does not track the Campbell analysis. In MarkIV, several individuals
and a corporation organized and syndicated limited partnerships for the
purpose of producing and distributing motion pictures with religious
themes."34 The organizers contributed certain film rights to the partnerships
and provided the partnerships with services in creating, producing, and
distributing the films.1 5 The organizers conceded that these services were
not provided as a result of arms-length negotiations between themselves and
the partnerships; instead, the partnerships paid the organizers
what the
6
organizers considered fair compensation for their services.1
The organizers also acted as the general partners of the limited partnerships. They contended that they received the general partnership interests in
exchange for the motion picture film rights; however, they failed to establish
any value for those rights. 7 Additionally, the organizers failed to show
that the partnerships had otherwise fully compensated the general partners for
their services.'
Thus, the court concluded "that the general partnership
interests were received entirely in exchange for services." ' 9 Having made
this determination, the court went through a three-step analysis in deciding
whether the general partners must report the value of their interests as income
upon receipt. 4
First, the court felt it had to decide "whether the general partnership
interests were capital interests or mere profits interests."14' Campbell, of
course, held that this determination was unnecessary. The tax court in
Campbellfound no distinction between capital and profits interests for section
721(a) purposes:"' "section 721(a) is inapplicable to the receipt of any type

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

60 T.C.M. (CCH) 1171 (1990).
Id. at 1172.
Id. at 1173.
Id.
Id. at 1174-75.
Id. at 1175.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
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of partnership interest in exchange for services."143 Here, however, the tax
court purported to use the pre-Campbell liquidation method of distinguishing
between capital and profits interests. 44 The court summarized the task of
distinguishing a capital interest from a profits interest as follows:
Deciding whether a partner's interest in a partnership is a capital interest,
rather than a mere profits interest, turns on whether that partner has the
"right to receive" a share of the partnership's assets upon a hypothetical
winding up and liquidation immediately following acquisition of the
interest, 5rather than the mere right to share in future partnership earnings or
4
profits.
First, in determining the general partners' rights, the court looked to the
Articles of Limited Partnership (Articles), which provided that, in addition to
receiving fifty percent of partnership profits and losses, the general partners
were "entitled to receive Fifty Percent (50%) of the liquidation proceeds of the
Partnership in the event of its liquidation."' 46 The Articles also provided,
however, that "[t]he proceeds of the liquidation shall be distributed, as
realized, in the payment of liabilities of the Partnership in the order provided
in Section 545.42 of the 1979 Code of Iowa, as amended."'147 Even though
"[s]ection 545.42 of the Iowa Code provides that the limited partners must be
repaid their capital contributions BEFORE the general partners," the court
concluded the following:
Here, a fair reading of ... the Articles indicates that the general partners
had the right to receive a specified share of the partnerships' liquidation
proceeds (assets). Thus, even if no partnership proceeds remained to be
distributed to the general partners after distributing the liquidating proceeds
in accordance with section 545.42, they nevertheless had the right to receive
a share of the partnerships' assets. 48
The right to receive a share in the liquidation proceeds was conclusive in
determining that the general partners had received capital interests in the
partnerships.
Second, the court determined that section 83 did not preclude the
inclusion of the interests in income because the general partner interests were

143. Campbell v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 236, 249 (1990).
144. The liquidation method approved in the pre-Campbell decisions is
summarized, supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
145. Mark IV, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1776.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1173-74.
148. Id. at 1176 (emphasis added).
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freely transferable and not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.
"Although petitioners were to perform substantial services in the future, the
transfer of their capital interest was not conditioned upon their further
performance of services. At the time the partnerships were formed, the capital
interests vested in [the general partners].' 49
Finally, the court considered "whether the capital interests [had]
determinable market values." Citing Diamond and Campbell, the court
declared that the fair market value of a partnership interest received in
exchange for services must be included in income upon receipt.'
The
Commissioner calculated the fair market value under Regulation section 1.7211(b)(1) by multiplying the total contributions made by the limited and general
partners by the general partners' ownership interest (fifty percent) and treating
that value as income for the year in which the partnership was syndicated,'
Although the court agreed that the values of the capital interests were
determinable and that section 1.721-1(b)(1) applied, 52 it amended the
calculation in two ways. First, the court treated the general partners' shares
of the limited partners' contributions as income for the year in which the
limited partnership interest was actually sold to the limited partners (as
opposed to when the partnership was syndicated). Second, the court deducted
the amounts contributed by the general partners in their capacities as limited
partners from the total amount of contributions to prevent them from being
53
taxed on the return of their own contributions.
A. A Vexing Valuation
The Mark IV court's valuation is completely baseless. The cost of the
court's mistake to the general partners was a tax liability on $338,492 of
income that they did not and could not have received. The regulations issued
under section 721 state that the amount to be reported as income "is
the fair
market value of the interest in capital so transferred ... at the time the

transfer is made for past services.', 154 While the general partners may have
had the abstract right to receive one half of the proceeds generated upon
liquidation of the partnership, that right was worthless at the time of its receipt
because the partnership agreement (and Iowa law) required the limited

149. Id. at 1177 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 83(c)(1) (1988); Treas. Reg § 1.83-3(b),
(c)(1) (1988)). See also supra note 69.
150. Mark IV,60 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1176.
151. Id. at 1177.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1177-78.
154. Id. at 1176 (quoting Treas. Reg § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1988)). See alsosupra note

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol57/iss1/11

20

1992]

Brennan:
Brennan:
Receipt of a Profits Interest
INTEREST
A PROFITS
TAXING

partnership to distribute liquidation proceeds first to the limited partners to the
extent of their contributions before making distributions according to the
partners' relative shares of earnings and profits. 155 At the time the general
*partners received their interests, a liquidation of the partnership would have
resulted in all of the partnership assets being repaid to the limited partners.
Thus, the general partners would have realized nothing upon liquidation.
True, the general partners could have shared in the proceeds of a later
liquidation if the partnership had acquired additional assets or the partners'
contributions had appreciated, 6 but, at the time of receipt, the capital
interests owned by the general partners were worth nothing. 5 '
Aside from the problem of valuing a capital interest, which tax advisors
may want to consider in drafting partnership liquidation provisions, Mark IV
raises some serious questions concerning the status of both Diarhond and
Campbell.
B. Mark IV

A Repudiation of Campbell?

After MarkIV, is Campbell's statement still true that any interest received
in exchange for services is includable in income? Apparently not, for if that
statement were true, then the tax court's discussion of the distinction between
capital interests and profits interests would have been unnecessary. One
cannot argue that the court in Mark IV was unaware of the recent Campbell
holding, because Campbell is cited in Mark IV.158 Is the liquidation method
of valuing a partnership capital interest in vogue again? It is interesting to
note that the Mark IV opinion, just as the Campbell opinion, does not cite any
of the cases falling between the Diamond and Campbell decisions. If the
liquidation method is correct, does one accomplish the calculation by
following regulation section 1.721-1(b)(1) or by following the Mark IV
interpretation of that regulation? Or, perhaps, might one value a capital
interest by reference to the prospectus for partnership syndication as was done
in Campbell? Is the present value of expected future capital losses considered
in valuing a capital interest received in consideration for services rendered to
a partnership? Unfortunately, Mark IV raises more questions than it answers.
Mark IV does, however, provide some hope that the Campbell decision does
not really mean what it says.

155. Id. at 1176. See also supra note 5.
156. See the similar assertion made in Kenroy Inc. v. Commissioner, 53
A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 84-718 (C.D. 111. 1983).
157. Id.
158. Mark IV, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1176.
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VII. CAMPBELL ON APPEAL: "THE ENIGMATIC EIGHTH CIRCUIT
DECISION

' 159

On August 27, 1991, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decided
Campbell's appeal, affirming in part and reversing in part the tax court's
decision.16° The opinion does not appear, however, to be the aspirin desired
by practitioners to cure the headaches caused by the earlier Campbelldecision.
In his brief, the Commissioner attempted to concede that the tax court
erred in holding that the profits interests received in exchange for services
rendered to a partnership were taxable. 61 The Commissioner contended that
the taxpayer received his profits interests from his employer rather than from
the partnerships. "According to the Commissioner, the tax court held that
Campbell received the interests as compensation from his employer. Thus, he
is not a service partner; the principles of partnership taxation do not apply;
and Campbell's receipt of compensation from his employer was taxable upon
receipt. " " The Eighth Circuit, however, declined to accept the Commissioner's concession." The court did not believe that the tax court had specifically found that the taxpayer had received his profits interests from his
employer.'" Also, the court noted that Diamond supported the tax court's
position and that the Commissioner had not previously asserted that only
partnership interests received from employers (rather than from partnerships)
as compensation are to be included in income. 165 Therefore, the court
disregarded the concession because it had been raised for the first
time on
1
appeal and was not adequately presented for the court's decision. 6
The taxpayer raised two arguments on appeal: the taxability of a profits
interest received in exchange for services, and valuation. 167
Although the
court considered the issue of taxability at length, it appears the court reached
no decision on this issue.'o In discussing the effect of section 721 and its
regulations, the court concluded that "some justification exists for treating

159. See Cuff, supra note 113, at 643.
160. Campbell v. Commissioner, 943 F.2d 815, 823 (8th Cir. 1991) (reversing the
tax court's holding that the Campbells should have included the receipt of profits
interests in Phillips House, The Grand and Airport in ordinary income in the year of
receipt, affirming the remainder of the decision).
161. Campbell v. Commissioner, 943 F.2d 815, 816-17 (8th Cir. 1991).
162. Id. at 818.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 818-19.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 819-23.
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service partners who received profits interests differently than those who
receive capital interests" because nonrecognition principles are not affected
where there is no capital asset transfer. 169 The court also addressed section
707, which "provides that when a partner engages in a transaction with a
partnership in a nonpartner capacity that transaction will be treated as between
the partnership and one who is not a partner."' 7 ° The court stated that in
Diamond the taxpayer had not intended "to function as or remain a partner"
and that he had become a partner only to avoid tax liability, leaving no doubt
that the taxpayer had acted in a nonpartner capacity. 71' Section 707,
however, would not be so easily applied to Campbell because his interests
were not transferrable, nor did they result in immediate retums;' 7 Campbell
was to remain a limited partner for the life of the partnership, and his profits
interest was not intended to disguise immediately realized income. "Thus,"
the court concluded, "we doubt that the tax court 73correctly held that
Campbell's profits interests were taxable upon receipt."'
The Eighth Circuit merely expressed its reservations on the taxability of
Campbell's profits interests, but it reversed the tax court only on the issue of
valuation.174 The court held that the tax court had put too much emphasis
5
The
on the amounts paid by Class A limited partners for their interests.
substantial differences between those interests and Campbell's interests made
the price of the Class A limited partnership interests irrelevant to the valuation
of Campbell's special limited partnership interests. 7 6 The tax court should
not have disregarded the expert's testimony that the tax benefits claimed were
speculative.'7 Also, the tax court should have realized that the offering
memoranda contained only speculative predictions about the operations'
success. 78 The court concluded that the taxpayer's profits interests had no
fair market value-at the time of receipt and should not have been included in
income at that time. 79
80
Rather
The Eighth Circuit's opinion has not been received favorably.

169. Id. at 822.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 822-23.
173. Id. at 823.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Sheldon I. Banoff, Status ofService PartnersRemainsUnclearDespiteEight
Circuit'sReversal in Campbell, J. TAX'N, Nov. 1991, at 268.; Cuff, supra note 114,
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than expressing displeasure with a result with which they disagree, the
commentators complain of the failure of the court to resolve the issues. "This
opinion is likely to receive considerable criticism for its reluctance to deal
with legal issues and its preference for making factual determinations of
value. , 181

The Eighth Circuit, which was made clearly aware of the case's importance
by the briefs of both the taxpayer and amici curiae, could have resolved
Campbell in any of a number of ways.... Instead, the Eighth Circuit
chose to decide the case on valuation grounds. In so doing, the appellate
court did little to resolve the controversies under Sections 61, 83, and182
721
relating to the taxability of partnership profits interests for services."'
In addition to criticizing the court for its failure to decide the taxability issue,
commentators have also focused on the Eighth Circuit's apparent confusion
of speculative value with no determinable value. 83 The difference between
speculative value and no value "is of importance administratively: it would be
difficult for most taxpayers to prove a profits interest has no value, but many
taxpayers will be able to prove their profits interests to be of speculative
value."' 84 The Eighth Circuit noted several problems with the tax court's
valuation of the profits interest: the tax court had placed too much emphasis
on the prices paid for the Class A limited partnerships, had disregarded the
speculative nature of the tax benefits to be claimed, and had ignored the fact
that the offering memoranda contained merely predictions of a venture with
no track record. One cannot discern which of these errors, or what combination of them, would lead to a conclusion that the profits interest were so
speculative as to have no fair market value. Similarly, the opinion doesn't
provide any guidance as to when the value of a profits interest will be
sufficiently determinable to be included in income, especially when future
value calculations and offering memoranda are not to be relied upon.
Nevertheless, the decision may have some limited value. "As a result [of
the Eighth Circuit's Campbell decision], many practitioners may conclude that
equilibrium has been re-achieved-such partnership profits interests, if
technically taxable, are taxable at a value of zero-a result that would satisfy
at 650-52. Indeed, the latter article criticizes the Eighth Circuit's opinion as having
"many characteristics of a badly written law school examination: issue spotting
without any attempt to come to grips with and to resolve any of the major issues." Id.
at 651 n.39.
181. Cuff, supra note 114, at 651.
182. Banoff, supra note 180, at 268 (emphasis added).
183. Banoff, supra note 180, at 273; Cuff, supra note 114, at 654.
184. Banoff, supra note 180, at 273 (emphasis added). See also Cuff, supra note
114, at 654-56 for an extended analysis of the Eighth Circuit's approach to valuation.
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most tax advisors and service partners, and would equate to nontaxabilThe result reached in Campbell suggests some strategies for
ity."8
avoiding taxation for profits interests received by service partners. For
example, the service partner should receive a restricted, special class of limited
partnership interests and should receive it from the partnership rather than
from his employer.'" Furthermore, the decision may prompt the IRS to
issue a Revenue Ruling or Notice as to when a partnership profits interest will
not be included in income."s The Eighth Circuit's "speculative value equals
no value approach" suggests that the Service should be cautious in litigating
cases where the profits interest, although potentially valuable, is speculative
"Such a
because of the difficulty in predicting financial performance."
message is appropriate-the courts (and taxpayers) should not be burdened
with litigating the accuracy of inherently speculative values." 89
VIII. CONCLUSION
Admittedly, there are situations in which the immediate taxation of the
receipt of a partnership profits interest makes sense. 190 Nevertheless, the tax
court's broad proposition in Campbell that "section 721(a) is inapplicable to
the receipt of any type of partnership interest in exchange for services"'9'
leaves much to be desired from both a policy and administrative perspective.
The significance of Mark IV remains completely up in the air. And because
of the court's reliance on specific valuation evidence, the Campbell appellate
opinion is of dubious precedential value. In sum, the current state of the law
lies in shambles. Further litigation is likely to ensue unless the Service or
Congress clarify the proper treatment to be afforded partnership profits
interests received in exchange for services. The Service must come to grips
with the problems it has wrought with its successful prosecutions of both
Mark IV and the taxability issue in Campbell, and the tax court must establish
the method to be used in valuing a partnership profits interest. If practitioners
are to receive any guidance whatsoever as to the treatment of partnership
interests received in exchange for services, the Service will have to take
responsibility for establishing workable rules. The Campbell experience has
demonstrated that dodging the issues until the courts rule may not be

185. Banoff, supra note 180, at 276.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See Cuff, supra note 114, at 50 for five specific situations in which
immediate taxation is appropriate.
191. Campbell v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 236, 249 (1990).
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satisfactory; the courts may fail to provide a set of uniformly applicable
guidelines, and what opinions are generated may vary with the facts or with
the lunar cycle.
MARK WINFIELD BRENNAN
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